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Abstract. While government regulations are designed to safeguard the health and well-being
of children, they may also alter the cost and availability of child care, thus affecting parental
use of such services. This paper investigates the total effects of regulation on parental choice
of child care and the indirect effects of regulation through the price, quality, and availability
of care. In our analysis of data from the National Child Care Survey 1990 we find strong
evidence that state regulations requiring center-based providers to be trained are associated
with a lower probability that parents choose a center, while state inspections are associated with
more parental choice of center and home care. We end by discussing the policy implications
of our findings.
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Introduction
The cost of caring for young children has been found to discourage mater-
nal employment (Blau & Robins 1988; Connelly 1992). Recent child care
research has attempted to obtain better measures of the incentive and disin-
centive effects of public policies on the cost, quality, and availability of child
care, and how these ultimately affect parental choice of employment and
care arrangements (Hofferth & Wissoker 1992). This paper focuses on the
effects of public policy, in particular, government regulation and inspections,
on parental choice of child care mode through price, quality, and availability.
One purpose of government regulation is to safeguard the health and well-
being of children, and there is evidence that it does so (Phillips et al. 1990).
Regulations can prevent parents from choosing low quality care and provide
them with valuable information regarding the price, quality, and availability of
care. On the other hand, government regulation may have detrimental effects
on the price parents have to pay and the availability of programs if these
regulations increase provider costs, which are then passed on to consumers,
or if they limit the number of providers who can enter or remain in the
field (Lowenberg & Tinnin 1992; Rose-Ackerman 1983; Walker 1991). If
regulations increase price and reduce availability, parents may use less child
care even if quality is higher.
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While regulations set standards, frequent inspections are critical to ensure
that regulations are enforced. As such, we expect them to affect the price,
quality, availability, and use of child care in the same ways and for the same
reasons that regulations do. However, inspections do vary independently of
regulations. Federal funding for licensing and monitoring has not increased
in proportion to the number of facilities (Kisker et al 1991). At the state
level, there is evidence that caseloads for state licensing officials greatly
exceed recommended levels. For instance, in North Carolina 43 licensing
consultants monitor over 6,565 day care and Head Start facilities (Office of
the Inspector General 1993). This suggests that some states may not view
licensing and monitoring as necessary for regulation.
Research questions. In this paper we address the following questions:
1. In what ways do regulations and inspections affect choice of arrange-
ments? In particular, do regulations and inspections affect choice by
influencing the cost, quality, and availability of arrangements?
2. What are the total effects of child care regulations and inspections on
parental choice of child care arrangements?
Theoretical model
Our model describes the choice of child care arrangements for youngest child
by mothers who are working, training, or in school. The decision to work,
train, or attend school is assumed to be independent of the child care decision.
A substantial amount of research has examined family and individual factors
associated with child care choice (Blau & Robins 1988; Hofferth & Wissoker
1992; Lehrer 1983, 1989; Lehrer & Kawasaki 1985; Leibowitz, Waite &
Witsberger 1988; Robins & Spiegelman 1978; Yaeger 1979); only a few
studies (Blau & Robins 1988; Hofferth & Wissoker 1992; Yaeger 1979) have
included measures of price, quality, or availability. Our approach explicitly
models choice as a function of the characteristics of the choices.
Families are assumed to have an expected price, quality, and availability
for each child care arrangement they are aware of. Within a mode families
face many options. We assume that parents evaluate the utility of each option
within a mode and choose the option with the highest utility, determined as
the expected price, quality, and availability of the option as well as income,
assets, tastes and a purely random component of utility. Parents then choose
the mode with the highest utility.
Government regulations are argued to affect choice through their effects on
price, quality and availability. It seems less likely that regulations have any
direct effects on tastes, income, or assets. However, because tastes, income,
and assets may be correlated with regulations and are likely to affect child
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care choices, we control for these factors. Lacking complete information on
the quality of care we allow for a direct effect of regulations in our empirical
specification.
Quality is multidimensional, which makes its measurement particularly
difficult. Quality is proxied here by the child/staff ratio of the child care
arrangement. While we wished to include other aspects of quality, particularly
the training of the provider, the models were not statistically stable and we
were unable to do so. The child/staff ratio is a key aspect of the quality of the
child’s experience in child care, with higher quality implied by a lower ratio
of children to staff. Other research has shown that the number of children a
provider cares for affects child-provider interactions and child development
(Hayes et al. 1990; Phillips & Howes 1987; Travers et al. 1980). In addition,
most states regulate this aspect of quality and it is one of the most costly of the
regulations (because staff costs constitute 2/3 to 3/4 of the cost of child care
(Kisker et al. 1991)). For these reasons we focus our analysis on regulations
affecting the ratio of children to staff in child care arrangements.
Besides child/staff ratio regulations, we also include regulations regarding
the level of training and education required for child care staff in centers
and family day care homes. Training regulations have been shown to affect
the utilization of child care. Trained staff may also recognize the value of
small child/staff ratios and maintain lower ratios than required by the state.
Finally, inspections serve as an important tool of regulatory enforcement.
For theoretical reasons and because inspections have been shown in prior
research to be strongly associated with child-care use, we examine the effect
of required number of annual inspections per provider by state on the price,
quality, availability, and use of centers and family day care homes.
The role of government regulation
Effective regulations can reduce the likelihood that children receive low qual-
ity child care, thereby improving the welfare of children (Hayes et al. 1990).
Regulations are often explained by this concern with child welfare (Hotz &
Kilburn 1995). In this section we explain how both a lack of information
about low quality care and the failure of parents to realize all the benefits of
good quality care can affect parental decisions and the quality of care that is
nearby.
A number of studies show that low child care quality is detrimental to
the development of children, particularly those ‘at risk’ (Hayes et al. 1990;
Helburn et al. 1995). Thus parents who are concerned about the welfare of
their children have reason to avoid low quality care. However, parents may
not select the optimal level of quality for their child.
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One reason that parents may provide lower quality care than is optimal
for them and their children is their inability to monitor the quality of care.
Since quality is complex and multifaceted, parents have difficulty assessing
the services provided in the child care market (Hofferth et al. 1994). Indeed
there are many dangers that parents would not normally think of and whose
effects they might never have discovered or attributed to low quality care
in the absence of regulations. For instance, probably few parents know the
importance of locating child care facilities on the first floor of a building so
that children can be easily evacuated in case of a fire. Nevertheless many states
include this provision in their regulations. Similarly, parents may not have the
means to check on staff credentials or unhealthy conditions such as lead pipes.
Even child/staff ratios can be difficult to monitor because groups shift often
during a day so that the staff available when a parent is present may not be
indicative of normal staffing. Because of these difficulties in monitoring the
quality of care, the price paid to providers is not likely to reflect actual quality
(Waite et al. 1991; Helburn et al. 1995). This low return to providing quality
causes quality to drop both because high quality providers have little incentive
to enter the field and because providers may be negligent in maintaining their
quality standards (Walker 1991).
A second reason that parents may choose lower quality care for their
children than is socially optimal is that many of the benefits of high quality
care do not directly affect parents or even their children, but instead affect
all of society through children’s behavior in school, employment, and the
community (Donovan & Watts 1990). For instance, research has found at-
risk children who participated in a high quality preschool program to be less
likely to be dependent on welfare or involved in criminal activities as young
adults than those who did not (Schweinhart et al. 1993). Thus, even in a
world of perfect information, parents might provide lower quality care for
their children than would be optimal from a societal perspective.
Net welfare effects. The discussion above suggests that there may be failures
in the child care market, due to imperfect information about child care qual-
ity, and positive externalities on child well-being. These are necessary but
not sufficient conditions for government intervention. Indeed some analysts
argue that providers, having more political clout than consumers, may push
for excessive government regulation. This is because providers may push for
increased regulation at least in part to increase their market power and, there-
fore, their earnings (Lowenberg & Tinnin 1992). However it is not clear that
the regulations that providers push for would be so different than those that
would benefit society as a whole. Therefore, even if regulations are affected
in part by the political clout of providers, they may still be worthwhile.
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To properly estimate the overall effect of regulations on society’s welfare,
we would need to know how much the benefit of the increase in expected
quality is worth to each parent, the value of the change in children’s outcomes
to society (other than the parents), the increased cost to parents, and the
costs of enforcing the regulations. These factors depend in part on how much
information the government is able to collect over and above what the parents
would have had in the absence of government intervention. Gormley (1990)
argues that local governments may be better suited than federal or state
governments in this regard.
While a complete analysis of the total benefits of child-care regulations is
beyond the scope of this paper, important policy implications can be derived
based on our analysis of the effects of regulations on the price, quality,
availability, and use of child care.
First, no increase in regulations is likely to benefit all parents unless offset-
ting compensation is provided to those parents who are negatively affected.
For instance even if regulations improve the quality of care in the regulated
mode they may decrease the quality of care for those children who, as a result
of regulations, shift out of the regulated mode and into unregulated care of
lower quality. If poor parents are most likely to lose, then subsidizing care for
the poor may serve to partially offset some negative effects of regulations. By
themselves, however, stricter regulations may exacerbate inequality.
Second, if use of a regulated mode increases with more stringent regulations
this implies that at least some parents have gained. The parents who switched
into the regulated mode reveal that to them the benefits of the regulation
outweigh any increase in costs that they face. Conversely, if use goes down
then at least some families have lost.
Finally, similar points can be made regarding the direct effects of price,
quality and availability. If price increases or availability falls, then some
parents are likely to lose. Conversely, if price falls or availability increases then
some parents are likely to gain. For these reasons, an analysis of the effects
of regulations on price, quality, availability, and use of care is informative for
public policy purposes. In the following section we describe how regulations
can affect the price, quality, availability, and use of care.
Effects of regulations. If parents are well-informed and regulations increase
actual and expected quality, then they are also likely to increase the price of
care and reduce use. However, in the following discussion we show that these
conditions need not hold so that no strong predictions can be made concerning
the effects of regulations.
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Quality. Regulations are intended to reduce the incidence of low quality care
in the regulated mode directly by removing low-quality providers from the
market and by increasing the incentive to provide quality care for existing
providers whose licenses can be suspended or revoked (Shapiro 1986). Reg-
ulations may also serve to increase the quality of care indirectly, by affecting
parents’ decisions. While parents are unlikely to know much about the regu-
lations themselves, information about the quality of child care can spread via
friends, social workers and companies that help locate child care for parents
(such as resource and referral agencies). Therefore regulations may serve to
reduce parents’ search costs and their uncertainty about the quality of care
they do choose (Lowenberg & Tinnin 1992). This increase in information
may, in turn, affect the quality of care provided by increasing the returns to
providing high quality care. While we have pointed to several positive effects,
it is also possible for regulations to have negative effects if parents rely on
their existence too heavily and reduce their own efforts at monitoring care.
Price. Regulations may also increase price both by increasing demand and by
reducing supply. However, these effects are not clear. First regulations increase
the demand for care only if they increase expected quality. As explained above
the effect on expected quality is not clear. In addition, even if regulations
increase quality from the regulator’s perspective, they may lower quality from
the parent’s perspective (Hotz & Kilburn 1995). For instance some parents
may prefer higher child/staff ratios than are allowed by regulations. For these
reasons the net effect of regulations on price via demand is unclear.
While the expected effect on demand is not clear, the expected effect of
regulations on price via supply is likely to be positive. Providers are likely
to reduce supply to offset the costs associated with regulations. Such costs
include hiring additional staff to reduce the number of children per staff
member, raising wages to attract staff members with higher educational and
training qualifications, providing subsidies to existing staff to meet increased
education and training requirements, and paying for facility modifications to
meet additional health and safety requirements. Regulations can also reduce
supply in the short run by giving producers who remain in the market extra
market power (Lowenberg & Tinnin 1992; Svorny 1987). In sum, while
regulations are likely to reduce the supply of care (and thereby increase prices)
the total effect on price is unclear because demand may fall if expected quality
declines (from the parents’ perspective).
Availability. The availability of the arrangement may also influence parental
decisions (Blau 1991). Child care is quite localized. In our work, availability
refers to the parent’s perception of the travel time to a provider with an open
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slot. It is measured as whether or not the parent perceives a child care provider
of a given type to be available within 30 minutes of home. On the one hand,
stricter regulations can decrease availability if a provider is unable to remain
in business after regulations are increased. As the number of providers falls,
the chance of being close to a provider in a fixed area falls. Also, regulations
reducing child/staff ratios may cause providers to reduce their enrollment if
they cannot hire more staff and this may reduce the availability of licensed
slots. On the other hand, regulations could positively affect availability if
they cause an increase in expected quality and thereby raise demand causing
providers to expand. The overall effect is ambiguous.
Use. The net effect of regulations on whether or not a parent uses care is
affected by the change in expected quality, price, and availability. While
regulations may increase expected quality, causing an increase in demand,
price may also rise and availability fall, offsetting the gain in expected quality.
Therefore the net effect of regulations on use of care is ambiguous.
Regulations may be ineffective. The effects discussed above are all contingent
on regulations being binding. This need not be the case. If regulations are so
lax that almost all providers would have met the standards in their absence,
regulations are unlikely to have much effect. Similarly, it is possible that the
government may create laws that would be binding if they could be enforced,
but which are essentially meaningless because the government regulators do
not or cannot enforce them (General Accounting Office 1992). This seems
especially likely to be true in the case of family day care, 80 percent of
which is either exempt from regulation or illegal (Willer et al. 1991). Finally,
regulations may also be ineffective in increasing the expected quality of care
for parents if regulators focus on aspects of quality that parents do not care
about. Training and child/staff ratios are good examples of this (Hofferth &
Chaplin 1994).
Evidence from previous studies
To date, three studies have examined child care consumption at the state level.
Lowenberg & Tinnin (1992) examined the relationship between two aspects
of state regulation – state requirements for the maximum ratio of children
to staff and preservice requirements for center directors – and the number
of licensed child care center slots in each state (n = 40), controlling for
other factors that are likely to influence child care consumption in the state.
The authors found a negative relationship between educational requirement
and number of slots and a positive relationship between child/staff ratio and
number of center slots at the state level. That is, the more restrictive the
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licensure requirement, the lower the number of child care slots. The authors
argue that this provides evidence that licensure restrictions in the US child
care center market do not benefit consumers. This conclusion is hard to justify
since the benefits to society in general and the consumers who continue to
use the mode of care regulated may greatly outweigh the losses incurred by
those who switch to other modes. While this paper is enlightening on some
aspects of licensing, it does not include any measure of enforcement.
Rose-Ackerman (1986) examined the proportion of all children under 18
enrolled in day care centers, a measure of consumption. She too found that
higher (or more lax) state child/staff ratio maximums were associated with
higher enrollment rates. The number of inspections, a measure of enforce-
ment, was not significantly related to consumption of child care centers.
While this paper is also interesting, the data were collected in the mid to late
1970s; substantial changes in the day care industry have taken place since
then, including greatly increased use and federal funding (Hofferth 1993). Our
data from 1989 provide a more up to date picture of current usage patterns.
Gormley (1991) examined the effect of regulation on the number of cen-
ters and regulated family day care homes per 1,000 children in each state.
His paper examined the influence of different types of regulations, catego-
rized based on their costliness, intrusiveness, and enforceability. According
to Gormley, not all regulations are likely to affect the number of child care
providers; only those that are costly or intrusive and enforceable. A handwash-
ing requirement may have large psychic costs for providers because it affects
day-to-day routines. However, it is probably not enforceable and, therefore,
is unlikely to affect the number of providers. In contrast, child/staff ratio and
training regulations are both costly and enforceable. Child/staff ratios are
costly because staff costs constitute the largest component of program costs
(Travers et al. 1980). Training regulations are costly because they generally
require staff to have completed a minimum number of hours in special course
work related to young children. These training requirements can affect the
costs of hiring qualified staff and training under-qualified staff.
Gormley (1991) found that stronger regulations were often associated with
fewer centers and family day care providers per child in the state. In particular
he found that for centers lax child/staff ratio requirements were associated
with a greater number of centers, and that for family day care homes a smaller
number of annual required inspections, and less strict liability insurance
requirements were associated with a greater number of regulated family day
care homes. Training regulations, in contrast, were not found to be associated
with a reduced number of centers or family day care homes. While Gormley’s
work is informative, he used aggregate data while we use individual level data.
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In addition, he lacked data on price, quality, and actual use (as opposed to the
number of providers), all of which are included in our analysis.
All three previous papers have found some support for a negative effect
of strict child/staff ratio regulations on the number of child care slots or on
aggregate consumption (proportion of children enrolled). Only the Lowenberg
and Tinnin analysis found a negative effect of educational requirements on
the number of licensed center slots. None of these papers examined how
regulations might affect individual family decisions regarding care.
Hotz & Kilburn (1994) analyzed the effects of regulations on the use of
non-parental child care arrangements at the family level. Using data from the
fifth follow-up to the National Longitudinal Survey of the High School Class
of 1972, the authors examined the effects of child/staff ratio regulations in
centers and regulations regarding the training of center staff and family day
care providers on the use of nonparental care by working and nonworking
mothers about 32 years of age. They did not examine inspections. As did
the other studies, the authors found that lax regulations are associated with
greater utilization of non-parental child care arrangements. This held for both
child/staff ratio regulations and education/training requirements for staff. The
only apparent exception was that the greater the education requirement for
center staff, the greater the utilization of nonparental care by nonworking
mothers. The authors also found a fairly substantial effect of regulation on
the amount parents pay for nonparental care; expenditures are significantly
lower in states with lax child/staff ratios and education/training standards.
Child care expenditures, in turn, have a strong negative effect upon child care
utilization by parents.
Our results improve on those of Hotz and Kilburn for several reasons.
First, we use four categories of care while Hotz and Kilburn were limited
by their data to parent versus non-parent care. Second, we use measures of
child/staff ratios in family day care homes and inspections. Third, our sample
of employed mothers is nationally representative while that of Hotz and
Kilburn was limited to mothers in their early thirties who were high school
graduates.
Although little research has explored the effect of state regulations, and
only one has examined parental choice of child care arrangements, the effects
are relatively consistent across the studies to date. Stricter regulations are
generally associated with lower utilization of child care. Stricter regulations
are also associated with higher priced care. None of these studies, however,
has looked at the direct effects of regulations on the quality of child care, a
key factor in determining its effectiveness.
One study (Phillips et al. 1992) examined the relationship between the strin-
gency of state child care regulations and quality of care in five metropolitan
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areas. The investigators found centers in states with more stringent regulations
to have better staff-child ratios, better-trained staff, and lower staff turnover
rates. While suggestive of the effects of regulation, this study is limited in its
generalizability.
The present paper is the first to examine the influence of both state reg-
ulations and inspections on parents’ use of care through their effects on
price, quality, and availability. We consider a larger set of possible child care
arrangements (center care, family day care, relative care, and father care)
than other papers on state regulations, a larger set of regulations, and incor-
porate parental reports of price and availability for modes of care not used.
Nor has the literature controlled for quality in looking at parental choice of
arrangements. For all of these reasons our paper represents an advance over
previously available evidence concerning the effects of regulations on child
care use.
Data
We use two unique data sets in this study – the National Child Care Survey
1990, and a file of contextual data on the counties in which this survey was
collected (the Contextual Data File).
National Child Care Survey 1990.The National Child Care Survey 1990
(NCCS) is a nationally representative survey of households with children
under age 13 funded by the National Association for the Education of Young
Children and the Administration for Children, Youth and Families (Hof-
ferth et al. 1991). This nationally representative survey of households with
children under age 13 was fielded by Abt Associates from November 1989
through May 1990. Through random digit-dial techniques, 4,392 households
located in 100 counties or county groups in 37 states were interviewed by
phone using computer-assisted telephone interviewing methods. The overall
response rate to the survey was 57 percent. A variety of data quality checks
indicate close agreement between the results of this survey and other national
surveys conducted in person and by phone with respect to child care arrange-
ments (Hofferth et al. 1991).
Contextual data file.Using a variety of sources such as the US Bureau of
the Census, the National Center for Health Statistics, and the Bureau of
Economic Analysis, we obtained data for 62 contextual variables in each of
the 144 counties and 37 states in the NCCS. Information was compiled on state
regulations regarding staff qualifications, child/staff ratios, and inspections for
centers and family day care as well as a number of characteristics not used
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in this study from Morgan (1987). Additional information was obtained by
calling officials at the state and county levels.
Selection criteria.We focus our analysis on children under 6 whose mothers
are working, in training, or in school. This is the group traditionally considered
relevant for child care policy. We analyze the primary child care arrangement
for the youngest child of those mothers.1 Cases in which the mother is the
primary provider are excluded. We select youngest children because many of
the important variables are only available for the youngest child. In addition,
the care decision for the youngest child is generally agreed to most affect
parental decisions regarding employment and child care (Leibowitz, Klerman
& Waite 1992). Finally, we select only cases in which the mother was the
respondent. Only 42 cases out of 1,341 are excluded because the father
answered the questionnaire. Excluding an additional 93 cases with missing
data, the final sample size is 1,206.
Methods
Approach
We analyze the effect of regulations on choice of child care arrangements
using both a reduced-form model and a path model. The reduced-form model
estimates the total effects of regulations on choice without controlling for
price, quality, or availability. The path model estimates the indirect effects of
regulations on choice via price, child/staff ratio, and availability, in addition
to the direct effects. This is shown in Figure 1. Regulations are hypothesized
to affect the price, quality, and availability of care, and through these paths to
affect the decisions that parents make.
The first step in laying out the path model is to examine the relationship
between regulations and the three attributes of child care – price, quality,
and availability. We do this by regressing our measures of price, quality and
availability on the appropriate regulations and the controls. The second step is
Figure 1. Path diagram for the effect of state regulation on the choice of child care arrangement.
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to estimate the direct effects of regulations on choice and the indirect effects
that occur through price, quality, and availability. We do this by regressing
child care use on the price, quality, and availability variables, in addition to
the regulations and controls, using multinomial logit regression. Below are
detailed descriptions of our reduced-form and path models.
Statistical models
Reduced-form model. In the reduced-form model we assume that the propen-
sity to make choicen for individuali (Vin) is a linear function of the relevant





iXn + ein (1)
whereRn andXn are vectors of parameters. Note that only the relevant
regulations affect the propensity for choicen.
The individual will choose the option with the highest propensity. Option
j will be chosen if,
Vij >= Vin; n = 1 : : : N (2)
whereN is the total number of child care choices available.
We also assume that the random components (ein) are independent across
individuals and modes of care. With this assumption, the probability that
modej is chosen by individuali may be written as,









For identification, the center care parameters on the control variables are
normalized to 0. The remaining parameters of the model are estimated using
maximum likelihood.
Path model. To estimate the path model we first use linear least squares regres-
sions to describe the association between the price, quality, and availability







inWn + uin for n = 1 : : : N (4)
whereRn, Xn andWn are matrices of parameters,Win are variables that
affect the price, quality, and availability but not choice of child care, andui
is a vector of unobservables affectingZin.
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Separate regressions are used for each mode of care (center, home, and
relative) except father care. For father care we assume the price is zero. The
child/staff ratio is the number of children in the family under the age of 6,
and availability is determined by the mother’s marital status.
We then add the price, availability, and quality variables (zin) to equation
1, which describes the multinomial logit regressions for choice of care. Since







iXn + in (5)
whereZn andRn are vectors of parameters andin is an error term of
unobserved factors affectingVin.
We use this path model to estimate both direct and indirect effects of
regulations. The indirect effects occur through prices, child/staff ratios, and
availability. The direct effects describe the association of regulations with
unobserved factors affecting child care choices.
We control for parents’ reports of price and availability and for only one
aspect of quality – the child/staff ratio. Price and availability may be measured
imperfectly. In addition, there are many other aspects of quality that we would
like to have measured and we lack controls for parents’ uncertainty about the
price, quality and availability of child-care arrangements. Finally regulations
may be correlated with unmeasured variation in all of these factors. For these
reasons we also estimate direct effects of regulations.
Measures of key variables
Child care choice. We distinguish four categories of care: center care, which is
care in a day care center or nursery school; home care, which includes care by
non-relatives in the home of the provider (family day care) or the home of the
child (sitter care); relative care (in the child’s or provider’s home); and father
care. The major distinction among types is based on the relationship between
the child and the provider, rather than location or payment status. From a child
development perspective, the crucial distinction is whether children are cared
for by a relative or by someone unrelated to them (Baydar & Brooks-Gunn
1991). Center and home care are separated because early research found that
family factors affect parents’ choices between the two. Because fathers are
not paid and not everyone has access to a second parent, father care was
separated from relative care. In addition, in results not presented here, we
found that the effects of factors associated with using care by the father or
by another relative differed significantly at the 5 percent level. Center care
is regulated in all states; home-based and relative care are not. Ideally, we
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would have separated regulated home-based from non-regulated home-based
care, but parents were not asked the regulatory status of their provider.
Regulations. We include five state regulations plus two measures of inspec-
tions in our models, three related to center care and four related to family day
care. For center care, the regulations include whether states require education,
training, or experience of teachers, the maximum child/staff ratio allowed for
programs with 2-year-olds, and the required number of annual inspections per
center. For family day care, the regulations we use include whether care pro-
grams are required to be licensed, whether provider training is required, the
maximum child/staff ratio for 2-year-olds, and the required number of annual
inspections per provider. The descriptive statistics for these regulations are
given in the Appendix.
Price. To calculate a price of care for each mode of care, we combined data
on actualandexpectedprices. Parents reported theiractualexpenditures on
child care for each arrangement that they used for the youngest child. These
actual expenditures are reported in a variety of units (hourly, daily, weekly,
bi-weekly, monthly, and annually) and for all children in the arrangement. We
used parents’ answers to calculate hourly prices per child. This is straight-
forward because parents reported the hours per day and days per week that
the child was in care. In this paper we use the actual expenditures on the first
arrangement. Only about one-quarter of parents have a second arrangement.
Data on theexpectedcosts of arrangements not used were also reported in
a variety of units. In this case, however, the hours per day and days per week
were not reported. Therefore, we had to estimate the expected hourly price
for each user that did not report expected price in hourly units. The details of
this estimation are discussed in Hofferth et al. (1996).
Finally, an actual or expected price was created based on the actual price
for the arrangement the respondent was using and the expected prices for
those she was not using. The mean of the actual and expected prices for
that arrangement was substituted for a missing value. Early versions of the
multinomial logit regression models were run with variables indicating that
means were substituted. This did not affect our substantive conclusions.
Quality. The measure of quality used in this analysis is the ratio of children
to staff (child/staff ratio) in the child’s group; a low ratio has been found to
be related to better developmental outcomes for children (Phillips & Howes
1987). In the NCCS, parents reported the number of children in their child’s
group or class and the number of teachers or providers caring for them. We
calculated the ratio of children to staff based on these reports. While we expect
a relationship between child/staff ratio regulation and child/staff ratio in the
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child’s group, there is substantial variation, with many programs exhibiting
child/staff ratios considerably higher than required by the state.
We only observe the child/staff ratios for the form of care used. Therefore,
we predict child/staff ratios for all the modes of care. Using coefficients
from the models for the child/staff ratios (see equation 4 above), we obtained
predicted measures of quality of care for each arrangement for each family,
whether or not they used the arrangement. Hofferth & Wissoker (1992) used
a similar method but corrected their child/staff ratio regressions for selection.
Because the correction terms were not statistically significant in their analysis,
we did not control for selection in our models.
Identifying variables for child/staff ratios. To identify the effects of child/staff
ratio on child care choice, we need variables that are related to child/staff ratio
but not directly to choice once the child/staff ratio and other variables are
controlled. For all modes of care we use the unemployment rate and average
per capita income in the county as identifying variables. For the child/staff
ratio of relative care we also use the relation of the child to others under 18
in the home and the education of relatives in the household.
Availability. Availability refers to how long the parents believe it would take to
travel to the nearest potential provider of care for their child.4 Parents using an
arrangement were asked how long it takes to travel to that arrangement from
their home. Parents not using an arrangement were asked whether they know
of a center, sitter, family day care home, or relative that would be available
to care for their child or a program their child could attend. If so, a second
question asked them how long it would take to get to that person or program
from their home.5 Our availability variable is an indicator for whether it takes
more or less than 30 minutes to travel to that arrangement. Non-users of a
mode of care who said they did not know if it was available were given the
value for 30 minutes or more.
Control variables. In all of our regressions we control for a set of factors that
may affect price, quality, availability, and demand for child care. Since parents
differ in their assets and preferences, we control for the characteristics of the
decision maker and the community in which he or she lives. The controls are
described in the Appendix.
Previous research has shown that centers and family day care homes set
fees based on the age of the child and whether the child is enrolled in school,
the income of the family, and the number of children in the arrangement
(Kisker et al. 1991). Providers tend to charge less for older preschool children
because they need less attention than younger ones. They also charge more
for before- and after-school care for each school-age child. Providing care
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during these hours may be more costly. In addition, these children occupy
slots that might otherwise go to full-day children.
For income we use the mother’s wage, other household income, and the
average income in the county. Mothers with low wages, education, and other
income probably pay less if they choose lower quality arrangements or if
providers charge differently according to their perceived ability to pay. The
average income of child care users in the area probably affects the avail-
ability of care for all individuals living in the area. We control for these
considerations.
We also control for number of siblings, the time of day the mother works, her
education, race and ethnicity, the county level unemployment rate for women,
and the per-capita income in the county. The time of day the mother works
affects fees; evening care may cost more than care during the day because
it is more burdensome to the provider. Education, race and ethnicity of the
mother control for differences in preferences regarding the characteristics of
child care purchased. Fees, quality, and availability may vary depending on
the county per capita income and unemployment rate, both of which measure
prosperity of the area and alternative employment opportunities for providers.
Results
The effects of regulation on choice
Table 1 provides three estimates of the estimated effect of regulations on
the percentage of families using center and home care. The first column is
based on the raw percentage differences in our sample using center care or
home care, by regulation status. The second column is based on the reduced
form model, and the third column is based on the path model. The coefficient
estimates for all regressions are available upon request from the authors.
The differences in use by regulation status, presented in the first column
of Table 1, show that regulating training is associated with 30.3 percent less
use of center care and 14.5 percent less use of home care. Lastly, having any
regulations is associated with 30 percent less use of home care.6 Only one of
the three raw percentage differences is statistically significant,7 bu all three
estimates are consistent with the hypothesis that regulations limit parental
choice.
In order to control for other factors that affect choice we estimate the
multinomial logit regressions discussed above. The reduced form model
includes the regulations as well as a number of controls, but excludes price,
child/staff ratio, and availability. The results of this regression are used to
calculate the estimated total effects reported in the second column of Table 1.
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Table 1. The estimated total effects: Percent change in use of mode
caused by regulations
Mode
Regulation Raw differencea Reduced formb Path
Centers
Training  30.3*  37.1**  33.3
(12.6) (13.4) (-)
Inspections - 17.7** 16.7
(6.0) (-)
Child/staff ratios - 1.1 4.0
(2.0) (-)
Home
Training  14.5  16.1  25.0
(10.1) (10.8) (-)
Inspections - 14.7** 18.2
(5.6) (-)
Child/staff ratios -  4.7  8.4
(3.2) (-)
Any regulation  30.0  48.7*  86.7
(21.2) (24.4) (-)
a The raw difference is the mean percent using the mode in states with
the regulation minus the mean percent in states without the regulation
divided by the sample mean. The standard error is calculated assuming
the denominator is fixed.b The estimated effects for the reduced form
models are the derivatives of the relevant choices with respect to the
variable of interest divided by the predicted probabilities. The standard
errors account for the variance in the denominator.

p < 0:05;  p < 0:01.
As can be seen, the total effects of training regulations and regulating family
day care at all are larger than the percent differences in sample means.
Requiring providers to be trained reduces the use of centers by 37 percent
and home care by 16 percent according to our reduced form model estimates
(column 2, Table 1). Table 1 also shows that living in a state requiring family
day care providers to be regulated at all reduces the use of home care by 49
percent. The estimated effect of a training regulation is statistically significant
for centers, but not for family day care, while the estimated effect of having
any regulations for family day care is statistically significant. These results
strengthen the evidence suggesting that regulations reduce use.
The reduced form model (column 2, Table 1) also shows that inspections
are significantly related to use for both center and home care. Surprisingly,
requiring more inspections is associated with increased rather than decreased
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use. Among the states in our sample, the average number of annual inspections
per provider is 1.72. Increasing the average number of inspections per year
by one inspection increases center use by 17.7 percent and home care use
by 14.7 percent in our reduced form model. The opposite effects would be
expected if inspections acted to reinforce the effects of regulation. Rather, the
results concerning inspections are consistent with the interpretation that they
reduce the probability of low quality care and thereby increase use.
Finally, the estimated effects of the child/staff ratio regulations for centers
and for family day care are moderately large but not statistically significant.
For center care, the average state child/staff ratio maximum for parents in
our sample is 7.4. Increasing the state child/staff ratio maximum by one child
increases center use by 1.1 percent in the reduced form model, less than its
standard error. For family day care the average maximum state child/staff
ratio is 3.8. Increasing the maximum by one child decreases use of home care
by 4.7 percent, less than twice its standard error. Because of the large standard
errors we can say little about the total effects of regulating child/staff ratios.
In sum, we find strong evidence that requiring center-based providers to be
trained lowers the probability that parents will choose a center. In contrast,
more frequent inspections are strongly associated with more parent use of
both center and home care. The effects of child/staff ratio regulations on use
are inconclusive because we estimate relatively large standard errors for both
center-based and home-based care.
Explaining the effects of regulation
The estimated total effects of regulations using the path model are presented in
the third column of Table 1. While coefficient estimates are rarely significant,
the path analysis is still helpful in demonstrating the proportion of variance
in the total effects of regulations and inspections that can be explained by
indirect effects through price, quality, and availability and that which remains
unexplained (the direct effect).
One might expect the total effects estimated using the reduced form and
path models to be identical. This does not happen in our models because
of sample selection and non-linearities. In a more typical path model the
intermediate variables are observed for the entire sample. Sample selection
occurs in our analysis because we observe child/staff ratios only for those
individuals who use the relevant form of care. The results also differ because
we use a non-linear model (the multinomial logit) to describe the choice of
child care arrangements.
For center care the estimated total effects from the path model are similar
to the total effects estimated using the reduced form model. For home care,
the path model estimates are larger in absolute size than the reduced form
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estimates, although, based on the standard errors for the reduced form model,
the differences are not statistically significant.
We use ordinary least squares to estimate all of the regressions in the first
stage of the path model. To calculate the predicted total effect of any regula-
tion we multiply the coefficient estimates on that regulation from the price,
child/staff ratio, and availability regressions by the corresponding estimated
effects from the child care arrangement choice model, and sum the results.
Added to this sum is the direct effect of the relevant regulation from the choice
model. These calculations are shown in Table 2.
Center-based care
Training. As shown in Table 2, all of the indirect effects of teacher training
regulations on choice of centers are negative. First, a state training regulation
increases price, and increased price reduces use of center care. Second, a
training regulation lowers the child/staff ratio, but, a lower child/staff ratio
decreases use. Third, a state training regulation reduces the availability of
center-based care, and lower availability reduces its use. The estimated effects
of training on price and price on use are statistically significant at the 0.10
and 0.05 levels, respectively, and in the expected directions. Of the other four
estimates, only the estimated effect of perceived availability on use of center
care is statistically significant and in the expected (positive) direction. The
direct effect of training on use of center care is negative but not statistically
significant.
The total effect of training regulations on use of center care calculated from
the path model is to reduce the use of center care by one-third ( 33.3 percent).
Of this, two-thirds (66.1 percent) is due to the ‘direct’ effect and remains
unexplained by price, ratio, and availability. Nineteen percent is explained by
the effect of training regulations on availability, and 12 percent by the effect
of training regulations on price. Only 2 percent is explained by the effect of
training regulations on child/staff ratios. These results are consistent with our
argument that, because they are costly, training regulations reduce child care
use by increasing price and reducing access, but the evidence is weak.
Inspections. In Table 2, we decompose the positive relationship between
inspections and the use of center care into its direct and indirect effects.
More frequent inspections are weakly associated with lower prices, increased
child/staff ratios, and greater availability, all of which are associated with
increased use of center care. Inspections also directly increase the use of
centers though the estimate of this effect is not statistically significant.
We showed earlier that inspections are associated with an increase of 16.7
percent in the use of centers (Table 1, column 3). Two-thirds (66.4 percent)
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Table 2. Decomposing total effect of regulations on use of care
Mode
Regulation Estimated effects Percent of total
Path Stage 1 Stage 2 Product
Center
Train
Price 0.227+  0.175**  0.040 11.9%
Ratio  0.421 0.019  0.008 2.4%
Available  0.046 1.410***  0.065 19.5%
Direct 1  0.220  0.220 66.1%
Total  0.333 100.0%
Inspection
Prices  0.080  0.175** 0.014 8.4%
Ratio 0.360+ 0.019 0.007 4.1%
Available 0.025 1.410*** 0.035 21.1%
Direct 1 0.111 0.111 66.4%
Total 0.167 100.0%
Child/staff ratios
Price  0.036+  0.175** 0.006 15.8%
Ratio  0.003 0.019  0.000  0.1%
Available 0.011* 1.410*** 0.016 39.0%
Direct 1 0.018 0.018 45.3%
Total 0.040 100.0%
+ p < 0:10; * p < 0:05; ** p < 0:01; *** p < 0:001.
is due to the direct effect of inspections on use and is therefore not explained
by price, child/staff ratio, or availability (Table 2). Twenty-one percent is
explained by the effect of inspections on availability, 8 percent by the effect
of inspections on price, and the remaining 4 percent by the effect of inspections
on child/staff ratios.
We hypothesized that inspections may raise the expected quality of the
modes of care parents consider and, through this path, affect their choices.
It does not reduce child/staff ratios as hypothesized. Since we do not have
a measure of quality other than child/staff ratio in our path model, it is not
surprising that most of the effect of inspections is direct.
Child/staff ratio maximum. Surprisingly, we find no statistically significant
effect of the state child/staff ratio maximum on the reported child/staff ratio
of the child’s arrangement, once other factors are controlled (Table 2). Indeed,
the estimated effects are unexpectedly negative for both center and home care.
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Table 2 (continued)
Mode
Regulation Estimated effects Percent of total
Path Stage 1 Stage 2 Product
Home
Train
Price 0.064  0.072  0.005 1.8%
Ratio  0.144 0.338  0.049 19.5%
Available 0.016 2.089*** 0.033  13.4%
Direct 1  0.230+  0.230 92.1%
Total  0.250 100.0%
Inspections
Price  0.062  0.072 0.004 2.5%
Ratio  0.034 0.338  0.011  6.3%
Available 0.022 2.089*** 0.046 25.3%
Direct 1 0.143* 0.143 78.6%
Total 0.182 100.0%
Child/staff ratios
Price  0.052+  0.072 0.004  4.5%
Ratio  0.082 0.338  0.028 33.1%
Available  0.031*** 2.089***  0.065 77.3%
Direct 1 0.005 0.005  6.0%
Total  0.084 100.0%
Any regulations
Price  0.440+  0.072 0.032  3.7%
Ratio  0.023 0.338  0.008 0.9%
Available  0.135+ 2.089***  0.282 32.5%
Direct 1  0.609+  0.609 70.2%
Total  0.867 100.0%
+ p < 0:10; * p < 0:05; ** p < 0:01; *** p < 0:001.
One possible explanation for this result is that parents are not well aware of
the child/staff ratios at their centers. Other evidence (Hofferth et al. 1994)
suggests that parent reports of child/staff ratios do not match those the centers
report, although parent reports on other characteristics such as price do match
(Willer et al. 1991.) Other explanations include misspecification of the model
and small sample sizes. It is also possible, however, that state regulations have
very little effect on child/staff ratios.
While we did not find the expected effect of child/staff ratio regulations
on reported child/staff ratios, we did find positive effects of child/staff ratio
regulations on use via price and availability, about which parents are prob-
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ably more knowledgeable. A higher child/staff ratio regulation is associated
with reduced price, though weakly, and is strongly associated with greater
availability of center care. Reduced price and greater availability are, in turn,
strongly associated with greater use of center care.
The total effect of increasing the child/staff ratio maximum by one is to
increase the use of center care by 4 percent, according to the path model (Table
1). The direct effect of the child/staff ratio maximum on use is not statistically
significant but accounts for 45 percent of the total effect (Table 2). Thirty-nine
percent is explained by the effect of child/staff ratio on availability and the
remainder (16 percent) by the effect of child/staff ratio on price. This evidence
suggests that regulations increase the price and reduce the availability of child
care.
Home care
Training. For home care, our path model explains little of the total effect
of training on child care use. In Table 2 we see that the effects of training
regulations on price, child/staff ratios, and availability are all statistically
insignificant. The estimated direct effect of training regulations on use from
our path model explains almost all of the 25 percent total effect of training
regulations and is significant at the 10 percent confidence level. The variables
included in the model are not sufficient to understand the effect of training of
family day care providers on care use.
Inspections. We find a significant positive association between inspections
of family day care homes and parents use of family day care. An increase
of one inspection per year per home increases use by 14.7 percent in our
reduced form model in Table 1. In Table 2, we see that inspections are not
significantly associated with price, child/staff ratios or availability. However,
the direct effect in the path model is statistically significant and explains most
(78.6) percent of 18.2 percent estimated impact of inspections in the path
model.
Child/staff ratio maximum. In Table 2 we see that the estimated effect of higher
child/staff ratio regulations on child/staff ratios is unexpectedly negative, as
is the effect on availability. In states with a higher child/staff ratio maximum,
parents report lower child/staff ratios in their children’s programs, though this
is not statistically significant. In addition, in states with more liberal ratios,
parents report less availability, an estimate that is statistically significant. The
estimated effect on price is negative and marginally significant (p < 0:10).
The total estimated effect of increasing the maximum child/staff ratio by
one is a decline of 8.4 percent in the use of home care based on the path model
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(Table 1). This is not the expected sign if higher child/staff ratio regulations
facilitate use. As can be seen in Table 2, most of this estimated effect comes
through the estimated effect on availability. In sum, the path model provides
an unclear picture of how child/staff ratio regulations affect either child/staff
ratios or use of child care
Any regulation. There is a positive estimated effect of having any regulation
on use of home-based care through price: Regulating family day care sig-
nificantly reduces price, and reduced price raises use. Having any regulation
for family day care is estimated to reduce child/staff ratios and availability,
but only the effect on availability approaches significance – at the 10 percent
confidence level.
The estimated effect based on the path analysis model, 87 percent, is
much larger than the reduced form estimate of 49 percent (Table 1) which
is significant. These large estimated effects are not due to the non-linearity of
the function. In addition, this result does not appear to be caused by a regional
effect because the states without regulations are spread out across the country.
While we have strong evidence that family day care regulations affect choice,
there is a great deal of uncertainty about the magnitude of the effect.
The direct effect of regulations on use is statistically significant at the 10
percent confidence level and accounts for about 70 percent of the total effect
in the path model, while the indirect effect through availability accounts for
most of the rest (Table 2). As discussed earlier, the estimated effect of having
any regulations on availability is negative and also significant at the 10 percent
level. Both of these pieces of evidence support the hypothesis that regulations
may serve to decrease use of the mode of care they regulate.
Discussion
The effect of regulations on use of centers and family day care homes is
negative, supporting other work suggesting that not all consumers benefit from
regulations. To understand why regulations and inspections affect parental
choice as they do, we examined the effects of regulations and inspections on
the price, quality, and availability of child care, and then looked, in turn, at the
effects of price, quality, and availability on parental decisions. We found that
observed patterns do not always meet our expectations. Though we believe
there is a relationship between regulations and child care use, we do not fully
understand how regulations and inspections affect parental use of child care.
Overall, our results support two general principles of the effects of regula-
tions. First,stricter regulations are weakly associated with increased prices
to consumers, and increased prices reduce use. Four of the five regulations
(not including inspections) increase price, and three of these estimates are
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significant at the 10 percent level. Higher prices, in turn, are associated with
less use, although the estimated effect for home care is not statistically signif-
icant. The indirect effect of regulation on use through price is small in spite of
the substantial effect of price on use because of the small effect of regulations
on price.
Second,stricter regulations are weakly associated with reduced availabil-
ity, and reduced availability lowers use. We find that stricter regulations are
associated with reduced availability for three of the five regulations variables,
and two of these effects are significant at the 10 percent level. Reduced avail-
ability, in turn, is significantly associated with less use of both center and
home care. The indirect effect of regulation on use through availability is the
largest of the indirect effects because of the large effect of availability on use.
We also find thatinspections facilitate use of care. Thus, inspections appear
to benefit at least some child care consumers. We find evidence that inspec-
tions are not costly to parents. For both center and home care, the point
estimate of the effect of inspections on price is small and negative ( $0.08
for centers and $0.06 for homes). Based on the small confidence intervals
(not shown), we conclude that adding one inspection per year is very unlikely
to add more than two percent to the cost that parents pay for child care. Indeed
it would probably reduce parental payments.
Inspections are also associated with increased availability for both center
and home care, although neither estimate is significant. Since the path from
inspections to availability is not statistically significant, we can draw no strong
conclusions about the ways in which inspections increase use. However, the
direct effects of inspections on choice are large and positive for both center
and home care and significant for home care. This suggests that another
intermediate factor, such as quality, may be the path through which inspections
affect parents’ use of care. In other words, inspections may provide users
with better quality care, which increases its use. Unfortunately, our measure
of quality was limited. Including other aspects of quality in future research
would provide a better test.
We estimate fewer significant results for home care than for center-based
care. Neither the training regulation nor the inspections regulation is signifi-
cantly associated with price, child/staff ratios, or availability, and the signif-
icant effect of having any regulation at all on price is negative. This may be
because most of the providers in our home-care category are not regulated.
Regulations apply only to non-exempt family day care; and 80 to 90 percent
of family day care is exempt from regulations or is operating illegally (Willer
et al. 1991). Our home care category also includes some sitter care that is not
regulated.
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Finally, it appears that price and availability explain a greater portion of
the variance in the effect of regulations on the use of center care than on
the use of home care. The indirect effects through price, child/staff ratio,
and availability explain about one-third to one-half of the total effect of
regulations and inspections on use of center-based programs while none of
the direct effects is statistically significant. The indirect effects explain only
a small fraction of the total effects of most regulations for home care while
the direct effects are statistically significant for three of the four variables.
Conclusion
This analysis provides evidence that some regulations may reduce parental
child care use. Our results regarding child/staff ratio regulations are unclear.
However, requiring providers to be trained does appear to reduce parent use
of center care while having any regulations appears to reduce use of family
day care. These results suggest that regulations do not benefit all consumers.
If we wish to use regulations to increase the training of child care providers
without reducing use, we must either increase government assistance to pay
for this training or educate parents to increase their willingness to pay for it.
Otherwise, regulations mandating provider training may cause some parents
to switch to nonregulated forms of care.
While training regulations reduce center use and the effect of child/staff
ratio regulations is unclear, inspections appear to have large and positive
impacts on use for both center and home care. In addition, we find evidence
against large positive price effects. This suggests that inspections benefit
some consumers. While in this paper we were not able to explain the effects
of inspections through child/staff ratio, inspections are likely to affect other
aspects of quality that were unmeasured in our analyses. Thus, more fre-
quent inspections may prove to be a useful way to improve quality without
increasing the price of care to parents, but more research is needed.
Finally, it appears that regulations may have indirect effects on parental use
of child care through availability and price.
Our results, suggesting that training regulations may limit use of care while
inspections are likely to increase use, should be of considerable interest to
state agencies considering overhauling their regulatory requirements, and to
federal agencies working to increase the availability of programs to needy
families. This research was, however, limited to certain types of regulations
and certain characteristics of child care arrangements. In addition, many of
our results were inconclusive. Additional research is needed using larger data
sets with more complete information on aspects of regulations and programs
that were not addressed here.
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Appendix: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean sd Description
CEN 0.313 0.464 1 if center care is used, 0 otherwise
HOME 0.257 0.437 1 if home care is used, 0 otherwise
REL 0.223 0 416 1 if relative care is used, 0 otherwise
DAD 0.207 0.406 1 if dad care is used, 0 otherwise
Prices and child/staff ratios (actual and predicted) and availability
AOEPCEN 1.776 1.294 Price of center care, actual or expected
AOEPHOME 2.107 1.541 Price of home-based care, actual or expected
AOEPREL 0.595 1.088 Price of relative care, actual or expected
RCEN 6.221 3.236 Child/staff ratio of center care, actual
RGRCEN 5.636 1.574 Child/staff ratio of center care, predicted
RHOME 2.926 2.141 Child/staff ratio of home-based care, actual
RGRHOME 2.845 0.771 Child/staff ratio of home-based care, predicted
RREL 1.458 2.088 Child/staff ratio of relative care, actual
CSRREL 1.452 0.400 Child/staff ratio of relative care, predicted
CEN30MIN 0.755 0.431 <30 minutes to nearest available center
FDC30MINa 0.590 0.492 <30 minutes to nearest available family day care home
REL30MIN 0.529 0.499 <30 minutes to nearest relative who could provide care
Regulations
TRAINCEN 0.852 0.355 Training of center teaching staff required in state
TRAINFAM 0.346 0.476 Training of family day care providers required in state
REGULFAM 0.934 0.248 Family day care homes are regulated in state
INSPCCTRb 1.720 0.979 Minimum annual inspections of centers
INSPCFDC 0.902 0.893 Minimum annual inspections of family day care homes
CSCENc 7.455 2.885 Max. child/staff ratio for centers with two-year olds
CSFAMc 3.767 1.990 Max. child/staff ratio for family day care with kids
< two years old
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Appendix (continued)
Variable Mean sd Description
Instruments for child/staff ratios
PRCAPINC 14.21 3.494 Money income per capita in county (in thousands)
UNEMPLRF 6.239 2.167 Female unemployment rate in the county
REL_<18 0.983 3.679 Child’s relationship to others under 18 in home
REL_ED. 0.874 3.210 Highest education of nonparental, nonsib relatives in home
Control variables
NRELS 0.104 0.406 Number of relatives in the household
OTHINCd 2.410 1.720 Income of other household members (in ten thousands)
MOMWAGEd 1.096 1.274 Mother’s hourly wage (in tens of dollars)
NONDAYd 1.110 0.282 Mother has a nonday job
EDUCMOM 13.62 2.141 Years of schooling of mother
BLACK 0.114 0.317 Mother is Black
HISP 0.076 0.266 Mother is Hispanic
AGE3T5 0.442 0.497 Child is 3–5 years old
NSIBO5 0.275 0.486 Number of siblings ages 0–5
NSIB612 0.468 0.699 Number of siblings ages 6–12
NSIB1317 0.076 0.301 Number of siblings ages 13–17
RSCHOOL 0.094 0.292 Child is enrolled in kindergarten or first grade
MARSTAT 0.813 0.390 Marital status of mother
aThe five missing values of FDC30MIN were replaced with the mean of the non-missing
values.bMissing values of the variables INSPCCTR and INSPCFDC were replaced with
predicted values based on regressions of the non-missing values on ONE, SMSA, URBAN,
SOUTH, CENTOKID, FDCTOKID, and CTRAINED. The latter three variables are county
level variables not used elsewhere in this analysis.cCSCEN and CSFAM do not vary with the
child’s age but are calculated based on state-level regulations which do vary with the age of
the children being cared for by the provider. The age categories used to calculated CSCEN
and CSFAM were chosen to simplify the calculations.dThe regression for missing values of
OTHINC used the same variables as the regression for INSPCCTR as well as EDUCMOM,
BLACK, HISP, AGE3TS, NSIBO5, NSIB612, NSIB1317, RSCHOOL, and MARSTAT. For
MOMWAGE, the variables OTHINC, AGEMOM (mother’s age), and WKEXP18 (weeks of
work experience since age 18) were added. The regression for NONDAY used the same
variables as that for OTHINC, with the addition of OTHINC and MOMWAGE.
Notes
1. The primary arrangement is the nonmaternal arrangement that the child was enrolled in
for the most hours. See Eichman & Hofferth (1993) for an analysis of factors associated
with choosing multiple modes of child care.
2. While it may be desirable to distinguish between pre-service and in-service training, since
only the former is likely to be a barrier to entry to the field, in practice this distinction is
not so clear. Few states require any pre-service training of family day care providers. For
centers, state requirements are more varied (Phillips et al. 1990; Morgan 1987). Since
there are few entry requirements for assistant teachers, most center staff are able to meet
education/training criteria by entering as assistant teachers and obtaining experience or
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in-service training (Morgan 1987). The distinction between pre-service and in-service
requirements seems small and does not constitute a barrier to employment entry.
3. Hofferth et al. (1994) compared parent reports with those of their family day care and
center providers on key characteristics of care including group size and child/staff ratios.
The results indicated that parent and provider reports of the child/staff ratio in family day
care were similar. The reports for child/staff ratio of center care were less similar, but
still significantly associated.
4. An alternative measure of availability is the number of child care centers and family day
care homes per 1000 children in an area. However, we found that this variable was not
related to parental behavior.
5. This question was not asked for sitter care so we used the answer for family day care
alone as a proxy for the availability of home care.
6. All states regulate centers so we cannot estimate an effect of having any regulations for
centers.
7. Throughout this paper ‘significant’ refers to statistically significant at the 5 percent
significance level unless otherwise specified.
8. We calculated the percent difference between the predicted probabilities with and without
the relevant regulations evaluated at the means for the other variables. The percent
changes calculated using this simulation method, also based on the reduced form results,
are substantively similar to the reduced form estimates reported in Table 1; 40.5 percent
for center training, 18.3 percent for home care training and 70.0 percent for any home
care regulations. Moreover, using this method we estimate that going from no regulations
and no training regulations for home care to having both causes a 90 percent drop in
use of home care. Similar estimated effects for all of the regulations are found when per
capita income and unemployment are added to the multinomial logit model for child care
choice.
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